the mother and father of a presidential candidate must be Zambian by birth. According to Article 34(3)(a-b), "A person shall be qualified to be a candidate for election as President if -(a) he is a citizen of Zambia; (b) both his parents are Zambians by birth or descent. "
7 It was quite apparent to most Zambians at the time that the MMD's objective was to frustrate the candidacy of former president Kenneth Kaunda, 8 the same person who had led the country to independence from Great Britain, and who at the time was challenging the MMD for leadership of the country.
The manipulation of citizenship laws to gain political and economic advantage is not limited to post-independence African states. During the colonial period in Africa, under many colonial rules, only peoples of European descent were granted full citizenship rights. For example, in French colonies, the Code de l'indigénat 9 represented a set of laws which created an inferior legal status for Africans (les indigènes) and a much more progressive and robust one (which involved the enjoyment of full citizenship rights) to colonial inhabitants of European origin or those Africans who had evolved to the European cultural ideal and hence, were considered by colonial authorities to have been fully assimilated. 10 Under this legal system, French citizenship was only granted to peoples of European origin and assimilated Africans (les assimilés)-these citizens enjoyed a lot of benefits, which included private property rights, especially in land, marriages that were recognized by the law, and perhaps, more importantly, exemptions from forced labor. (presenting a series of essays that explore the differences and similarities between French some of these homelands 18 independent and sovereign countries, effectively and unilaterally depriving the "citizens" of these Bantustans of their South African citizenship. 19 Long before the South African government began its systematic effort to abrogate the citizenship rights of African groups by creating so-called "homelands" or "bantustans" 20 and declaring these artificial creations independent states, it had already undertaken legislation to attenuate these rights and make it virtually impossible for African groups to function effectively as citizens within South Africa. One of the most important of these pieces of legislation was the collection of laws that was enacted by James Barry Munnik (JBM) Hertzog's Pact Government to create what came to be known as the "civilized labor policy. " 21 sala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1991; SOUTH AFRICAN DEMOCRACY EDUCATION TRUST. The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 1970 -1980 . Pretoria, South Africa: Unisa Press, 2004 (both monographs examining, inter alia, how the so-called homelands, which were created by the apartheid government as a mechanism to deprive various South African ethnocultural groups of their South African citizenship, became the battlegrounds that actually contributed significantly to the demise of apartheid in the country). 18 These were (1) Transkei, (2) Bophuthatswana, (3) Venda, and (4) Ciskei. Once the apartheid government declared these bantustans independent states, their citizens effectively lost their South African citizenship and were now considered as "foreigners" in the land of their birth. 19 See, e.g Press, 1993 . Africans who had been pushed into these "independent" homelands were no longer eligible to apply for South African passports and since none of the independent bantustans were granted diplomatic recognition by other countries (except South Africa), it meant that citizens of these homelands could not travel to other parts of the world using documents issued by their governments. This effective control of the South African government by white labor and Afrikaner farmers set the stage for massive and unrelenting state intervention in the labor market and produced the foundation for the apartheid state, which came into being in 1948. The legislative agenda ushered into South African political economy by the Pact Government had two
The latter was made effective in South Africa through several pieces of legislation, the most important of which were the Industrial Conciliation Act No "legally entrenched the concept of White labor supremacy" 23 in South Africa for many generations. The civilized labor policy effectively reserved certain skilled jobs in factories and the mines exclusively for whites and in the process, made it virtually impossible for Africans to exercise their full citizenship rights, especially in economic markets. 24 This political and opportunistic manipulation of citizenship rights set the stage for the establishment of the apartheid system in South Africa in 1948, a system that lasted until 1994. Cato Journal, 1991, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 135-150 . The basic fear of Afrikaners, most of whom were primarily poor farmers, was that greater cooperation between "white capitalists" and "black workers" would relegate them to the economic periphery. However, instead of helping poor whites acquire necessary skills to become competitive in the labor market, Afrikaner leaders, with the help of the National Party (of South Africa), opted for government intervention, first, through the creation of the "civilized labor policy" (see, e.g., DOXEY, supra note 21) and the regulation of all forms of social interaction (e.g., the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act No. 55 of 1949, which banned all marriages between people of different races), and second, through the establishment of the apartheid system in 1948. Apartheid was determined to eliminate all forms of non-government sanctioned economic cooperation between the races, which Afrikaners feared could lead to greater social integration within South Africa. White farmers, the majority of whom were Afrikaners, saw the civilized labor policy and apartheid-era legislation, which strictly limited African access to industrial jobs, as creating a large pool of cheap labor, which they could utilize at minimum cost in their farming operations. For a public choice treatment of the relationship between "black" or "African" labor and agriculture in apartheid South Africa, see LOWENBERG, Anton D. , 1998. 25 Despite the existence of a lot of legislative acts (collectively referred to as the "color bar" legislation (see, e.g., HUTT, supra note 21; DOXEY, supra note 21 & WILLIAMS, supra note 21) that had effectively abrogated the rights of African groups to participate competitively in South Africa's labor market, Afrikaners and white labor, in the aftermath of World War II, were still convinced that profit-maximizing capital would, should the opportunity ever avail itself, opt for a colorblind labor market, one in which wages would be competitively determined without the interference or intervention of the government and race
Framing the Problem

Colonialism and Citizenship
After the Europeans annexed or captured African territories, the next step was to establish institutions of social, economic, and political control. 26 The overarching objective of the colonialist was to establish an institutional structure within the new colonies that would enhance the maximization of European objectives.
27 Thus, economic, social and political development of the colony would not function as an important determinant of access to employment opportunities.
See, e.g., MBAKU, supra note 24, p. 148. White capital, many Afrikaners feared, would eventually push for the passage of legislation encouraging and enhancing closer intergroup relations and racial coexistence, a development which many whites, especially poor Afrikaners, believed would threaten their welfare. The existing system of property rights, which effectively rendered the citizenship of most African groups within South Africa economically nonviable-these groups were not allowed to engage fully in and benefit from economic activities-"could not be passed from generation to generation unless the strict separation of races was maintained. " MBAKU, supra note 24, p. centuries. This policy, as officially propagated by French colonial officials, was designed to provide colonial "subjects" the opportunity to gain French citizenship by adopting French culture and language. Africans were also expected to abandon their traditional pursuits, such as hunting and gathering, and engage in "civilized pursuits, " which included wage labor. The policy of assimilation was in line with many of the official justifications for colonialism, one of which was to "civilize" Africans by helping them "evolve" to the French/European cultural and linguistic ideal. The policy faced a lot of opposition in the colonies and was eventually downgraded to "association. " For an introduction to the French policies of "assimilation" and "association, " see BETTS, Raymond F. Princeton University Press. Mamdani's book is very important because it shows that both direct (France) and indirect (Britain) rule, as well as apartheid, were designed to achieve the same purpose-European despotism and permanent African political, economic, and social inferiority within the colonies. Direct rule abrogated the citizenship rights of Africans ("subjects" or "sujets") on racial grounds while indirect rule created a "customary" framework of governance that effectively abrogated the citizenship rights of subjects and granted Native Authorities appointed and sanctioned by the colonial state the right to define what constituted "custom" and hence, the types of citizenship rights that could be enjoyed by people who were not of European origin. It is important to note that evolved or assimilated Africans-that is, those "natives" who had achieved French of Portuguese citizenship-were not insulated from racial discrimination. The purveyors of colonialism claimed that theirs was a civilizing mission, whose primary aim or objective was the extension of the fruits of technological advances (i.e., modernity) to what were often referred to as "backward races"-implicit in this ideology was that the peoples of Africa, the Americas, and Asia, who were different from the Europeans, were culturally inferior and had to be civilized. 33 Viewed from this perspective, colonialism was simply a temporary activity, for, once the "uncivilized races" were civilized and fully assimilated, colonialism would lose its raison d' être and would disappear. 34 Colonialism, of course, was not a civilizing mission. For one thing, the peoples of these colonies did not need "civilizing. " For another, the people who came to these colonies from Europe did not bring with them institutions that would have significantly improved the welfare of Africans. Instead, what the Europeans brought to the African colonies were institutions of plunder, cruelty, despotism, and exploitation. 35 Europeans, argues Robert Fatton, Jr., a noted political scientist and expert on colonialism in Africa, imposed both themselves and their institutions on the African peoples and created within each colony, a political, economic, and social system that brought to the Africans many years of humiliation, degradation, and infantilization. 36 In the process, Africans lost their right to live and function freely as citizens in their own lands.
Colonialism, contrary to its proponents, was never a benevolent mission designed to share technological advances with the peoples of Africa. 37 Instead, it was a violent and insidious project designed specifically to subjugate Africans, abrogate their citizenship rights in their own lands, and enhance the ability of the Europeans to exploit Africans and their resources for the benefit of the metropolitan economies. 38 As argued by Hugh E. Egerton, an expert on British imperial history, the "motives which prompted the European nations upon the field of Harald, MANN, Michael (eds. colonization were in the main two, viz, the desire to win converts for the church, and the desire to win wealth for themselves. " 39 Lord Frederick Lugard, a distinguished British colonial officer and architect of Britain's indirect rule in Africa, opined that the colonies were critical sources of raw materials for industrial concerns in Britain and important markets for the sale of excess output from British industries.
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The British, like other European colonialists in Africa, did not plan to establish mutually beneficial relationships with Africans, those which would have prevented the various groups in each colony from being subjected to a degraded form of citizenship. For example, to win converts for their churches and create opportunities for their entrepreneurs to engage in profit-maximizing activities, the government of Great Britain could "have sought to establish diplomatic relations with various African kingdoms and states, with the latter allowed to maintain their independence. Once established, such inter-state relations, as they are today, would have allowed Christian missions to come to the African states and peacefully seek converts for their churches, and British entrepreneurs and traders would also have been able to seek opportunities to enter into mutually beneficial exchanges with their African counterparts. "
41 Instead, Britain, like many other European countries, which at the time practiced "mercantilism, " instead of "capitalism" as we understand it today, chose to engage in commercial practices that involved force (primarily violent conquest) and not mutually beneficial free exchange. In doing so, the British imposed on their colonies institutional arrangements that derogated the citizenship rights of the "native" populations and relegated these peoples to the political and economic periphery.
The argument that the European colonial powers never intended to engage in mutually beneficial arrangements with Africans is supported by pronouncements from important colonial officials of the 19th century, when the "scramble for Africa" 42 was at its peak. For example, in 1841, then French Governor-General of Algeria, General Thomas Robert Bugead, declared that "[w] henever the water supply is good and the land fertile, there we must place colonists 43 without worrying about previous owners. We must distribute the lands [with] Lexington, Massachusetts: Heath, 1972. 43 With respect to the African colonies, the "colonists" were Europeans who had settled in the colonies and intended to make the latter their permanent home. They were also referred to as "settlers" or, in the case of France, "les colons. " 44 BRACE, Richard M. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: PrenticeHall, 1964, p. 48. summarized the feelings of his fellow settlers in southern Africa towards Africans or the "native tribes" as they were called when he declared that whenever and wherever there was conflict between British settlers and any African group, especially over land and water-use rights, the "facilities should be afforded the white [British] colonist for obtaining the possession of land theretofore occupied by Native tribes. "
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In virtually all European colonies, "Native tribes" were viewed by the colonizing population-the colonial officers, planters, missionaries, farmers, miners, and prospectors-as uncivilized peoples who needed to be civilized and saved from their "savage" and "uncivilized" ways. Missionaries saw these peoples as "lost souls" or "heathens" who needed to be converted to Christianity in order to guarantee them a place in Heaven. In their uncivilized stage, as judged by the colonialists, these Africans could not enjoy the same citizenship rights as the Europeans.
46 Nevertheless, as was the case in French and Portuguese colonies, if the Africans were willing and able and, did indeed, "assimilate"-converted to Christianity, accepted French (Portuguese) culture and language, and took a job of a European nature (e.g., wage employment, which implied the abandonment of their traditional and customary pursuits), they would be considered "evolved" enough to be granted French or Portuguese citizenship and could then become eligible to enjoy the same citizenship rights as their European counterparts.
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It is important to note that the scramble for Africa involved significant levels of force and violence and hence, it was inevitable that the laws and institutions that helped the Europeans achieve their goals in the continent would themselves be instruments of violence and oppression. Since the Europeans were determined to use the coercive apparatus of the state to effect the allocation of the resources of the colony, the institutions of law and order (e.g., the police force and the judiciary) evolved into instruments of violence to enhance the ability 45 Specifically, it was at the heart of the French Code de l'indigénat, which created a special and inferior class of citizenship for the African inhabitants of the colonies and subjected them to activities (e.g., forced labor) that were considered inappropriate for civilized people (i.e., the Europeans). 47 This, of course, was the theoretical foundation of the assimilation policies in both French and Portuguese colonies. It was, however, not unusual for fully assimilated or evolved Africans to either lose their elevated citizenship rights or have them attenuated if they engaged in activities (such as joining anti-colonialism organizations) that were considered by the colonial government to be detrimental to the colonial enterprise. of the Europeans to subjugate Africans and effectively reduce them to "secondclass" citizenship status. 48 This state of affairs was, of course, considered by the resident European population to be essential to their ability to maximize their objectives, which included the accumulation of wealth. Note, for example, the fact that during the apartheid period in South Africa, white/Afrikaner farmers preferred and sought a derogation of the citizenship rights of Africans in order to create a cheap "black" labor pool that could be exploited to the economic and financial advantage of these farmers. 49 
Independence and the Hope for New Citizenship Rules
Most Africans, especially those who were involved in the struggle for independence, believed that independence would grant them the opportunity "to rid themselves of not only the Europeans, but also of their laws and institutions and then, develop and adopt, through a democratic process-specifically, a peopledriven, bottom-up, participatory, and transparent institutional reform processinstitutional arrangements based on their own values, aspirations, traditions, and customs. " 50 These new institutional arrangements would allow Africans to develop a "common citizenship, " one in which all the citizens of each country would have equality before the law and be granted equal opportunity for selfactualization within all parts of the country, regardless of their racial or ethnic affiliation. The hope was that the post-independence government would not create the multilayered, group-based or racially-based citizenship that was pervasive in many colonies throughout the continent. For, it was these multilayered citizenship arrangements that were used effectively by the European colonialists and colonists to oppress and infantilize Africans. Science, 1995, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 277-306. 49 See, e.g The post-independence institutional arrangements were also supposed to fully and effectively constrain civil servants and politicians and prevent them from engaging in opportunistic manipulations of citizenship rules to their political advantage. In fact, the manipulation of citizenship rules, which has become quite common in many countries in the continent, has been used by many politicians to silence their competitors and critics, as well as enhance their ability to stay in office indefinitely. In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, the manipulation of citizenship rules actually prevented Alassane Ouattara from contesting the presidency of the country in 2000. 52 In Zambia, the MMD political party used similar tactics to prevent the person who led Zambia to independence from contesting the presidency in 1996. 53 What were the expectations of many Africans of their new governments? Put, another way, what did most Africans expect of their post-independence constitutions and institutions? Certainly, no African groups expected that the institutions of their new countries, like those of the colonial state, would be used to disenfranchise them, render their citizenship inoperable, and effectively relegate them to the political and economic periphery. In fact, the issues that gave impetus to the decolonization project included, inter alia, the relegation of African groups to an inferior form of citizenship that made it virtually impossible for them to participate gainfully in the economy, at least at levels of participation that were equivalent to those enjoyed by their European counterparts. Mandela then went on to argue that his interest and that of the struggle of which he was a part, was not to dismantle apartheid, which was characterized by a multilayered citizenship system, with Africans at the bottom, and replace it with a new system, albeit also multilayered, in which Africans would be elevated to a higher citizenship level and whites would be placed at the bottom. Instead, he argued, he sought to eliminate both "white" and "black" domination and establish within South Africa, a system of equality based on a nonracial form of democracy. Within the society that Mandela envisioned for South Africa, there would only be one class of citizenship (i.e., a common supranational South African citizenship) and it would be available to all peoples, regardless of their race or ethnicity.
55 He declared as follows:
During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.
56
In the post-apartheid South Africa envisioned by Mandela and his African National Congress colleagues, citizenship would be based, not on race, ethnicity, or some other ascriptive trait, but on a shared vision for peaceful coexistence of all groups, equality of opportunity for self-actualization, and a society undergirded by the rule of law. This approach to citizenship and government was made an important part of the foundation for South Africa's post-apartheid constitution. For example, South Africa's Interim Constitution of 1993 57 contained 34 55 MANDELA, supra note 54. 56 MANDELA, supra note 54. 57 In April 1993, the various parties that were negotiating an end to apartheid in South Africa and the subsequent construction of a new political, economic and social dispensation, restarted negotiations through an instrument that came be known as the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP). An MPNP committee suggested the development of a set of "constitutional principles" which would undergird the country's final and permanent constitution and which the latter had to comply with. The process was designed, inter alia, to make certain that many of the problems that had plagued the country in the past, which Political Principles with which the permanent constitution had to comply-for example, the first one states as follows: "I. The Constitution of South Africa shall provide for the establishment of one sovereign state, a common South African citizenship and a democratic system of government committed to achieving equality between men and women and people of all races. " 58 South Africans, informed by their experiences, especially with respect to citizenship, under the apartheid system, were quite concerned about how citizenship would be defined and practiced in the new post-apartheid South Africa. Hence, they took a particular interest in rights-based constitutionalism and made certain that those who were entrusted with the drafting of the country's permanent constitution had to be guided by certain critical constitutional principles-the latter enshrined in them important values that were of great interest and importance to South Africans, especially those who had been subjected to the indignities of apartheid. These values included, inter alia, "a common citizenship, " "universal adult suffrage, " "non-racialism, " the protection of "all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and liberties, " and "equality before the law. " 59 Unfortunately, this careful and deliberative approach to constitution making, which the South Africans adopted during the reconstruction and reconstitution of the apartheid state and which allowed them to bring to the table discussions about the nature of citizenship, what it means and how it should be designed, was not adopted by other African countries during the process of constructing or designing their own constitutions. 60 During the decolonization and immediate post-independence periods, most African countries did not take constituincluded the oppression of Africans by the white minority, would not re-occur and that the country would be able to develop and sustain a common South African citizenship, based not on race or ethnicity, but on shared ideals, which included equality before the law, peaceful coexistence, and equal opportunity for self-actualization. The MPNP proceeded to construct the Interim Constitution of 1993, which was eventually enacted into law by Parliament and came into force on April 27, 1994. 
Citizenship and Africa's Dysfunctional Decolonization Project
The decolonization project in the African colonies was supposed to achieve certain objectives, the most important of which was to help the people and their emerging leaders fully transform the critical domains-the political, administrative, and judicial foundations of the state-and provide institutional arrangements that were capable of, at the minimum, (i) providing the wherewithal for the effective management of diversity and the promotion of the peaceful coexistence of all ethnocultural groups; and (ii) dealing fully with citizenship-citizenship rules had been manipulated during the colonial period to marginalize and oppress Africans and enhance the ability of the European colonialists and colonists to maximize their interests, which included the exploitation of Africans and their resources for the benefit of the Europeans. The hope was that, unlike the colonial period, the definition of citizenship and the rules governing it would be based on an effort to forge a common national citizenship for all peoples and not on race or ethnicity.
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In virtually all the African colonies, the decolonization project, the most important part of which was constitution making and the transformation of the critical domains, was dominated and controlled by three important groups, none of which was representative of the bulk of the African populations of each colony. These were (i) the colonial state, its political operatives and bureaucrats; (ii) the European entrepreneurial class, which consisted of traders/shop owners, planters, miners, and other commercial agents; and (iii) a relatively small group of highly educated and urban-based African elites, virtually all of whom had been educated in Europe, had lived and worked there for many years, and had fully adopted/accepted European cultures, customs, and values.
63 Unfortunately for constitution making and state reconstruction in pre-and post-independence Africa, these three groups-colonialists, European entrepreneurs, and urbanbased indigenous elites-were not representative of the various population groups that inhabited each colony at independence. Of critical importance is the 61 See, e.g fact that none of these three groups of people were elected by the relevant stakeholder groups within each colony to represent them in the process of designing and adopting institutional arrangements for the new countries that were emerging from colonial rule. 64 Additionally, the urban-based elites who were supposedly representing the people at the constitution-making conferences were not well-informed about the "social, political and economic conditions then existing in most of the colony, " 65 nor were they aware of specific issues (e.g., peaceful coexistence, citizenship) that would have a significant impact on political economy in the post-independence state.
The usual procedure adopted by these three actors for constitution making was the imposition on the African peoples of institutional arrangements that did not reflect the people's values, interests, and customs and traditions. 66 There was a general failure to fully consult and obtain the input of all relevant stakeholder groups within each colony during the constitution-making process. As a consequence, many critical issues, including citizenship, were never made part of constitutional discourse.
67 That failure to consult and engage citizens in constitutional discourse meant that most people did not have the opportunity to examine and fully understand and appreciate the meaning of a "common citi- zenship" and how it was to be exercised. For example, despite the emergence of a new super structure called Nigeria, many people in the new country continued to identify primarily with their ethnocultural unit, only considering themselves as citizens of Nigeria when they needed something from the central government (e.g., an international passport to travel abroad).
In 1958, Charles de Gaulle and his Fifth French Republic offered the country's colonies in sub-Saharan Africa 68 free association as autonomous republics within the French Community (Communauté française). Of all of France's colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, only Guinea, which considered the offer an attempt by France to force Guinean citizens to accept second-class citizenship within a community of nations controlled from Paris, rejected the offer and voted against the constitution.
69 The colonies that voted in favor of the 1958 French Constitution effectively deprived their own citizens of the opportunity to engage in robust constitutional discourse and determine the nature of the institutions that were to govern them in the post-independence period. In doing so, they gave up robust discussions of various critical issues, including especially citizenship, as it related, for example, to the rights of individuals to travel freely within the country and to participate in political and economic markets in all parts of the country, regardless of ethnic origin and/or place of birth.
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The approach to constitution making adopted by France's colonies in subSaharan Africa 71 was to forego robust constitutional discourse and simply adopt the model provided by the French Constitution of October 4, 1958. Many schol-68 These colonies included UN Trust Territories, which technically were not colonies, but were nevertheless administered as colonies. These included what was generally referred to as "French Cameroons" and "French Togo, " all of which were former German colonies but were ceded to the League of Nations after German defeat by Allied Forces dur- ars have criticized this approach to constitution making. In addition to the fact that it deprived citizens of the colonies of the opportunity to engage in serious and robust debate about various constitutional issues, including for example, the nature of the structure of post-independence government, citizenship (whether to define it through the constitution or by legislative acts), it also prevented them from reflecting fully on various concepts of governance (e.g., democracy and what it offered them, especially in the area of human rights, peaceful coexistence, the extent to which the state had to be constitutionally constrained in order to minimize government impunity, and human development). In criticizing the decision by the UN Trust Territory of Cameroons under French administration to vote yes to de Gaulle's constitution, political scientist and expert on constitutions and constitutionalism in Francophone Africa, Victor T. LeVine 72 stated that although the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic was drafted "in the context of the constitutional crisis that brought De Gaulle to power" in France, the "circumstances surrounding the writing of the Cameroun 73 constitution were not in any way analogous to those existing in France in 1958. " 74 LeVine 75 argues further that the constitutions of the former French colonies "created (i) national legislatures based on universal suffrage, (ii) legal and judicial systems resembling those of France, and (iii) governments nominally ratified by parliament, but in fact wholly responsible to the president. The resemblance to the French system was certainly more than nominal since the text of several of their constitutions, especially in sections dealing with the presidency, followed the French document almost word for word. "
76 What is critical for the purpose of the discussion in this paper is that by relying so much on foreign constitutional models and foregoing a people-driven, inclusive and participatory constitutionmaking process, the African peoples were deprived of the opportunity to fully discuss critical issues, such as citizenship, that would later create many problems for them in the post-independence period.
What, then, is the problem with citizenship in Africa today? Although the issue of citizenship is an extremely complex one, three aspects of it are critical for political economy in the majority of African countries today. The first one is the failure of many countries on the continent to build a common national citizenship-as in, for example, a common Nigerian citizenship, defined not by ethnicity, religion or other ascriptive trait, but by allegiance to the concept of a Nigerian State characterized by fidelity to the rule of law, belief in peaceful coexistence of all groups, equality before the law, equal opportunity to engage in self-actualizing activities, etc. 77 The second aspect of citizenship that is relevant to the discussion in this paper is the right of each citizen, regardless of their ethnic origin, to free internal exit-with the case of Nigeria, any citizen, regardless of whether they are Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa, or a member of one of the other more than 300 ethnocultural groups that inhabit the country, can migrate to any part of the country, readily establish residency there, and subsequently participate in all aspects of the economic, political and social life of that community. They can, for example, freely engage in entrepreneurial activities to create wealth for themselves without discrimination from so-called "indigenes" of the region or town or village. In other words, in terms of rights, duties, immunities, and privileges, citizenship must prevail over the country's entire territory, without regard to where within the country the citizen was born or where his or her ancestors were born. 78 Finally, citizenship must not be used as a tool to marginalize political opponents or prevent certain individuals from participating fully in the political life of the country, including standing for elections to important positions in government. In the rest of this paper, we examine these issues and make recommendations on how African countries can engage their citizens in robust national dialogue to confront these issues and build constitutional safeguards that enhance the construction of a common citizenship and minimize the opportunities for governments to manipulate laws and institutions governing citizenship either to marginalize their political opponents, disenfranchise them and prevent them from participating in governance, or make it difficult for citizens to travel freely throughout the country and establish residency in any part of the country that they desire. But first, we must revisit the concept of differentiated citizenship and see how it impacts nation building.
Differentiated Citizenship and Nation Building in Africa
Introduction
During the colonial period in Africa, there was a lot of intolerance and prejudice (i.e., discrimination based on skin color, as well as on religion). 80 Although a significant level of the exploitation and discrimination that occurred in the colonies was orchestrated by the Europeans-colonialists and colonists-and directed at indigenous African groups, intergroup conflicts, some of them related to or caused by historical prejudice, were quite common. 81 Many of Africa's foresighted pre-independence nationalists, specifically those like Ruben Um Nyobé (of the former German colony of Kamerun) 82 and the Gold Coast's Kwame Nkrumah, 83 sought to establish, in the postcolony, institutional arrangements that enhanced the effective management of ethnocultural diversity and provided the wherewithal for peaceful coexistence of all of their countries' diverse population groups. 84 forms of impunity and marginalize groups that oppose government policies). 80 The French indigénat system was just one example of the way European colonialists restructured colonial institutions to provide themselves with the wherewithal to exploit, infantilize, and discriminate against Africans. In today's modern democratic countries, especially those such as Canada and the United States, which are characterized by significant levels of ethnocultural diversity, constitutional provisions have been used to provide the tools and the wherewithal to manage diversity. For example, through the Bill of Rights, the United States Constitution has provided protections for the fundamental rights of all citizens. 85 Canada has provided its peoples with similar constitutional protections. 86 The management of diversity in Canada and the United States has also involved granting citizens certain freedoms, including freedom of association and of speech and mobility (including especially the right to move freely throughout the country and freely engage in exchange and contract), as well as the right to form political organizations (e.g., political parties) and participate in their respective countries' political life. 87 With respect to Canada, Kymlicka 88 has argued that while "the protection provided by these common rights of citizenship is sufficient for many of phy. During his trial for treason before the Pretoria Supreme Court on April 20, 1964, he made clear that his intention and that of his compatriots in the African National Congress was to dismantle apartheid and create a new society in which all persons, regardless of their racial background or the ethnocultural group to which they belonged, would enjoy equality before the law and be granted the right of self-actualization. See MANthe legitimate forms of diversity in society, " 89 other forms of difference can be accommodated only through special legal or constitutional pressures, above and beyond the common rights of citizenship. " 90 Kymlicka goes on to argue that certain types of diversity can only be managed effectively if citizens are granted what is referred to as "differentiated citizenship. "
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In the study of diversity in Africa, it is important to recognize the fact that many of today's African countries are actually multination states-the formation of these states has involved the bringing together of various distinct groups or nations, each with its own customs and culture, as well as laws and institutions. For example, the Republic of Cameroon can be described as consisting of a "federation" of Anglophones and Francophones or a confederation of several ethnocultural kingdoms (e.g., Nso' , Bamoun, Bangwa, Mankon, Bali-Nyonga, Oku, just to name a few). Before the arrival of the colonialists, who engaged in determined efforts to dissolve many of these kingdoms, they were actual nations in the "sociological sense of being historical communities, institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, and sharing a distinct language and history. "
92 Many of today's African countries are made up of several "nations" and hence, can be considered as "multination states. "
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The process of colonization of African territories involved the bringing together, through force, of various ethnocultural groups to form single political and economic units, which the Europeans could more effectively control and exploit.
94 These units were officially referred to as colonies-in the post-independence period, these units, wholly or with some modifications, would become independent states. For example, the German colony of Kamerun, which came Science, 1995 Science, , vol. 8, no. 3, 1995 (discussing, inter alia, the founding of the British colony of Nigeria).
into being in 1884, 95 included parts of present-day Gabon, Republic of Congo, Republic of Cameroon, Nigeria, Central African Republic, and Chad. 96 Many developed countries that are "multinational" (e.g., Canada) have tried to deal with the problems of governance by adopting a federalist form of government. Several scholars have argued that if a "different balance of power had existed [during the founding of what is now a federated Canada], it is possible that Aboriginals and French-Canadians would have retained their original sovereignty, rather than being incorporated into the larger Canadian federation. " 97 A similar claim can be made about present-day Nigeria, which came into being through the amalgamation of the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the Northern Nigerian Protectorate. 98 As is evident by the continued struggle between various cleavages in Nigeria either for control of the central government in Abuja or for secession to form their own sovereign states, 99 had a different balance of power existed during the colonial period, many of the ethnocultural groups that the colonialists had forcefully brought together to form the colony of Nigeria in 1914, would have preferred to retain their sovereignty and remain independent polities. Cameroon: From Federal to Unitary State, 1961 -1972 . Limbe, Cameroon: Design House, 2004 NDI, Anthony. Southern West Cameroon Revisited (1950 -1972 As a consequence of the political and economic domination of the country by the Francophones, a lot of Anglophones tried to improve their chances of surviving and, perhaps, flourishing, in this new country, by assimilating to the French cultural ideal-in addition to learning French and proceeding to communicate, especially in public, exclusively in French, many of them either adopted French spellings for their names ("Ndoumbé" instead of "Ndumbe") or French versions of their names (e.g., "Philémon" instead of "Philemon").
However, beginning in the early-1990s, many Anglophones who had embraced assimilation as a survival technique within this francophone-dominated political and economic entity, began to openly and expressly reject that assimilationist approach to nation building and call for a constitutional model that would grant them the power to retain their heritage (e.g., the common law, 106 At the time of unification, the former British-governed territory, which took the name West Cameroon in the new federation, accounted for about 9 percent of the total land area and 20 percent of the population of the federation. Cameroon, 1961 -1972 . Journal of Scientific Research and Studies, 2016 . Studies, 2002, vol. 1, no. 3, p. 135. English language, and the highly decentralized form of government)-that is, allow them to exercise their right of self-determination. 110 Nevertheless, Anglophones who were agitating for a change in the country's institutional structure were split into two groups: (1) those who were demanding restoration of the federation and the federated state model, which would allow the Anglophones to retain their institutions and maintain the type of political and economic autonomy that had been granted them by the federal constitution of 1961; 111 and (2) those Anglophone activists who sought a total and complete disengagement from the Republic of Cameroon and the formation of a sovereign and independent state with an internationally recognized character.
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Cameroon is not the only country in which some ethnocultural groups have rejected the assimilationist approach to nation-building 113 and are opting for an institutional model that enhances the ability of each group to retain certain aspects of its ethnic or cultural heritage and still remain part of a vibrant and viable nation-state. Thus, according to this system of polyethnicity, although all groups work towards national integration and the building of a single, unified nation, the institutional arrangements also allow each group to maximize its own unique values. 114 Cameroon's Anglophones argue that those of them who insist on using English as their main medium of communication should not be con-110 MBAKU, supra note 109. 111 Some Anglophone "constitutional federalists" saw the 1961 federal constitution as incapable of guaranteeing the type of autonomy that they sought. Hence, while they supported a return to federalism, they wanted new constitutional dialogue that would allow them to craft a more federalist constitution, one that would more effectively guarantee their rights and freedoms. Most countries in Africa are multinational and polyethnic, partly due to colonial conquest and forced amalgamation of the conquered nations into single political and economic units that came to be known as colonies. 115 In countries such as Nigeria, some of these "nations" are demanding that their governments grant them the right of self-determination, which they claim was abrogated through colonial consolidation and other post-independence political manipulations. 116 Like the Québécois in Canada, some ethnocultural groups in Nigeria are demanding "certain powers of self-government, " 117 which they argue, they never relinquished or gave up when they were forcefully incorporated into what came to be called the colony of Nigeria-the latter would subsequently become the independent Federal Republic of Nigeria.
In recent years in Nigeria, the extremist group called Boko Haram has been engaged in a violent and destructive campaign to transform northern Nigeria into an Islamic State. Nevertheless, before Boko Haram began its violent revolt, many Muslim leaders, especially in the northern states, had already been demanding the imposition of various Islamic institutions (e.g., Sharia law) on their communities. In writing about the rights of minority groups in Canada, Kymlicka 119 distinguishes between "self-government rights" and "polyethnic rights. " 120 He argues that "[l]ike self-government rights, [polyethnic] rights are not seen as temporary, because the cultural differences they protect are not something we seek to eliminate. " 121 He states further, however, that "unlike self-government rights, polyethnic rights are usually intended to promote integration into the larger society, not self-government. "
122 Viewed from this perspective, one can conclude that polyethnic rights are more likely than self-government rights to promote nation building and the development of a "common national citizenship"-while the various ethnocultural groups would still be able to maintain their unique cultural practices, they would be able to do so as citizens of a larger community called the "nation. " 123 Within many African countries, various groups have been advocating for self-government rights, as well as for polyethnic rights. First, some groups do not want to assimilate and integrate into their existing polities and, as a consequence, they do not demand either self-government rights or polyethnic rights. Instead, they want to secede and form their own independent and sovereign polity with an internationally recognized identity-this is the desire of some Anglophone activists in Cameroon, 124 who do not want to integrate into the predominantly Francophone Republic of Cameroon. They desire, instead, to resurrect the now defunct UN Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons under British administration and transform it into an independent and sovereign nation. Anglophone Cameroon's secessionists no longer want to remain citizens of a francophonedominated country-they seek citizenship in a new country. Second, other groups are willing to remain within their existing polities, work towards a mild form of national integration and nation building, with the understanding that existing institutional arrangements would be reconstituted or transformed to provide them with the right of self-government. Like the Québécois in Canada, these ethnocultural African groups want a federal form of government in which they can have significant jurisdiction over issues that are important to the maintenance of their cultural identity. This is the desire of some Anglophone activists (i.e., the so-called "federalists") in Cameroon, as well as that of many ethnocultural groups in other African countries (e.g., the Zulus in South Africa; the Oromo of Ethiopia, although some Oromo activists actually prefer a "greater-Oromo-nation" that brings together the Oromo from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia to form an independent nation, separate from present-day Ethiopia, and Kenya, Somalia-this latter group seeks to give up their Ethiopian citizenship and acquire citizenship in a new Oromo nation; and the Igbo of Nigeria).
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As exemplified by the Greater Somalia movement in the Horn of Africa, many ethnic "nations" whose members are found in more than one country (e.g., Somali of Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti; and the Yoruba of Nigeria & Benin Republic) have, at varying times, campaigned and advocated for the establishment of a new, independent and sovereign polity encompassing all their members from the nations in which they currently reside. 127 Supporters of these so-called "greater ethnic nations" have argued that the scattering of the peoples of these "ethnic nations" was a result of the events that made up the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), which set the stage for the arbitrary and artificial partition of the continent and the forceful resettlement of members of various ethnic groups in two or more countries. For example, as argued by the supporters of a Greater Somalia nation, the colonization of the Horn of Africa (i.e., the Somali Peninsula) and the eventual drawing of boundaries by various European countries destroyed the Somali nation and scattered its citizens into what are today four independent countries-Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia. The Somali people, it is argued, have the right to self-determination by reconstituting that state, which was destroyed by colonialism. 128 Finally, similar to the treatment of minorities in Canada, some individuals and groups who advocate on behalf of ethnocultural groups in Africa have argued that rather than look only at secession or self-government within existing polities, it might be possible to create "special representation rights" for these groups-through such a process, government and governance can be made to fully and effectively reflect the diversity of each country-whether diversity is based on language (as in Cameroon), ethnicity (as is the case in many countries in the continent), or on religion.
Under the "special representation rights" approach, there would be one common citizenship but certain political rights would be granted minority groups. For example, a certain number of seats in the upper legislative chamber (i.e., the Senate) would be reserved for members of heretofore marginalized and deprived groups. Representation in the lower house, however, would be based on population. The evidence from many countries in Africa shows that many minority ethnocultural groups, either due to their remote (and relatively inaccessible) geographic location within the country, or their failure to acquire skills in the "official language" of the country (English in the former British colonies; French in the former French and Belgian colonies, etc.), their extremely high levels of poverty and material deprivation, or other impediments (e.g., deliberate policy by the government, such as Jim Crow laws in the Southern United States, which effectively deprived African Americans from fully participating in economic and political markets, and apartheid laws in pre-1994 South Africa, which imposed similar constraints on the participation of the country's black majority in governance), have generally been underrepresented in the legislature and other public decision-making bodies. Thus, it is argued, there is urgent need in these countries to find ways to guarantee the representation of these groups in political decision-making.
129
Since independence, many African countries have undertaken constitutional reforms or amendments, supposedly in an effort to deal with issues of the representation of minorities in government. Unfortunately, virtually all of these institutional reforms have been elite-driven, top-down, non-participatory, and not representative enough to include many of the marginalized peoples and groups. In addition to the fact that these reforms have usually been controlled by a small group of urban-based political elites, there was never any effort to fully and effectively consult all relevant stakeholder groups and seek their input before engaging in the process of reconstructing and reconstituting national institutional arrangements. 130 As a consequence, these reforms have failed to produce mechanisms to enhance more participation, by minority subcultures, in political systems.
The overarching issue in Africa today is citizenship and how each African country can develop a common national citizenship for all its diverse groupswhether the groups are defined according to ethnicity (e.g., the Igbos, Yorubas, and Fulani in Nigeria), language (the Anglophones and Francophones in Cameroon), or religion (the Muslims and Christians in Nigeria). The most effective way to secure such a common national citizenship is to engage all relevant stakeholder groups in inclusive and participatory constitution making to produce laws that define citizenship based on allegiance to the same values (e.g., democracy, rule of law, equality before the law) that define the nation, as well as minimize the ability of ruling elites to manipulate the laws to marginalize their political opponents and/or get rid of critical and opposing voices.
Conclusion
After more than sixty years of independence, many countries in Africa have still not yet been able to find ways to prevent the manipulation, by ruling elites and their supporters, of national constitutions for political advantage. As a consequence, many politicians continue to use the constitution-amendment process to enhance their ability to monopolize political power. 131 This problem arises, partly, from the fact that many countries in the continent have yet to entrench the concept of a common citizenship in both their constitutions and their political discourse.
In countries, such as Canada and the United States, that are characterized by significant levels of ethnocultural diversity, constitutional provisions have been utilized effectively to provide the necessary tools to manage and deal with this diversity. For example, through the Bill of Rights, the U.S. Constitution has provided protection of the fundamental rights of all citizens, regardless of their racial, national, or ethnic origins. Canada has provided its diverse peoples with similar protections. However, it is important to note that the inclusion of a Bill of Rights in a country's constitution is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the effective protection of fundamental rights. Sufficiency requires a governing process undergirded by a separation of powers with effective checks and balances-that is, one that effectively prevents ruling elites from engaging in various forms of opportunism (e.g., manipulating the constitution to discredit political opponents).
Africans expected independence to offer them the opportunity to create, through a participatory and inclusive process, governance processes that reflected their values, ideals, worldview, and aspirations. Perhaps, more importantly was the fact that Africans were expected to use the constitution-making process to deal fully with the issue of citizenship-the hope was that each country would create a common citizenship, based not on race, religion, or ethnicity, but on the belief in or fidelity to a set of values or ideals, which were elaborated in the constitution and which would define the nation. Of course, the new institutional arrangements were also expected to adequately constrain post-independence civil servants and political elites and prevent them from engaging in any form of political opportunism. Unfortunately, constitution making in most of the African colonies was top-down, elite-driven, and non-participatory. As a consequence, issues of importance to the various ethnocultural groups that live in these countries, such as citizenship, were not fully examined by the people. It is for this reason that citizenship remains a highly contested issue in virtually all these countries. For example, in addition to the fact that presidents in many African countries have been able to easily manipulate laws regulating citizenship to gain advantage over their political rivals, many citizens are unable to fully utilize their citizenship within their own countries. In fact, it is often the case, for example, that Nigerians of various ethnocultural groups are not able to travel freely throughout the country and establish residency in any part of the country that they desire. Such efforts are often rebuffed by people who consider themselves indigenes to the area or so-called "native sons" or "sons of the soil. "
